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A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J.
SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv, 242. $29.95.
ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NONJUDICIAL WRITINGS
OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited by Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95.
During a thirty-seven year tenure as a federal judge, J. Skelly
Wright has drawn both criticism and acclaim for his views on the role
of judges and their use of discretion in adjudication. His personal
roots are in the deep South. It was there that he started his legal career as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1936, a position he attained
largely because of the influence of a relative who was a New Orleans
politician. However, Wright's association with the political elite of
Louisiana wiis shattered when he ll:isisted, as a young district judge,
that the New Orleans school district ra,cially desegregate its school
system in order to conform with the Sµpreme Court ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education. 1
The desegregation cases brought Skelly Wright to the attention of
John Kennedy, who later appointed hirp to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in 1962. Arthur Selwyn Miller2 believes that Wright has come to be "the best known of all federal
judges, except, of course, those on the Supreme Court" (p. xiv). 3
A "Capacity for Outrage" is structured so that Skelly Wright's (and
Miller's) views on different areas of substantive law and the challenges
facing American society are discussed on~. at a time. Racial equality,
the constitutional role of administrative l,aw in modern America, the
rise of the "Nationa,l Security State" after the Second World War, personal autonomy, and crime are eac;p. a(\l~resse4 separately. Yet these
separate chapters are only conveiiiep.t. ·pigeonholes for grouping together similar cases or disputes. The book's main themes are developed continuously and transcend the discrete categories found in the
table of contents.
The central focus of the book is, not surprisingly, Judge Wright's
judicial activism and his related con,cern for social justice. Miller argues that judges have more discretion than the formalities of the
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1!154).
2. Arthur Selwyn Mill.er is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Washington University and
Adjunct professor of Law at Nova University Center for.the Study of Law. He has previously
published DEMOCRACTlC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CoNSTITUTION OF CONTROL
(1981); THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PR~VATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1976); S,OCIAL CHANGE AND FU.NDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING
CONSTITUTION (1979); TJIE SUPREME CoURT: MYTH 4N.O REALITY (1978); and TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: :rHE PoLmCAL ROLJ> OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
3. All parenthetical page references are to A '.'Capacity far Outrage."
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American legal system appear to provide for them (p. 19). He rejects
the assumption that "principled reasoning" and reliance on community consensus are honest approaches to jurisprudence. He refers to
this reliance on abstract notions of law as "intellectual dishonesty"
because it only shrouds personal predilections that are always at work
in a judge's decisionmaking process (pp. 32-35).
Miller cites as an example of the traditional "restrained" judicial
approach the first of two cases that J. Skelly Wright argued before the
Supreme Court. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 4 Wright represented a black teenager on a petition for habeas corpus after a
botched execution failed to kill him. The primary target of Miller's
wrath is Justice Frankfurter, who voted for a second execution attempt after concluding, in Miller's words, that "abstract principles of
federalism outweighed the facts of a bungled execution" (p. 33).
Miller also chastises Justice Jackson for rejecting his personal opinion
about the case in the name of judicial restraint and for asserting that
judges should be guided by "society's law." Unlike the more classical
positions of Blackstone and Holmes (pp. 20-23), Miller stresses that
the determination of what society's laws should be was the very issue
before the Court and should not have been ignored by the Justices (p.
31).

The central theme of A "Capacity for Outrage" is that judicial
"good deeds" should be embraced, not scorned. This is the judicial
approach that Willie Francis' attorney later employed as a federal
judge, in part, Miller suggests, because of his frustration with his experience in Francis. Skelly Wright himself has explained his reasons for
approving of judicial discretion even to the point of relying on personal "hunches":
The judicial process forces a judge to take the short run into account. ...
[H]e must bend principles in order to produce a result he can live
with .... The judiciary is different from the political process. It is in the
nature of courts that they cannot close their doors to individuals seeking
justice. [p. 35]

The full extent of Skelly Wright's activism is made evident in
Miller's chapter on personal autonomy. In In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 5 Skelly Wright approved a request by
a Washington hospital to administer a blood transfusion to an adult
woman who had refused the transfusion because of her religious beliefs. Wright issued the order within hours of the hospital's request
after a district judge down the hall had refused to intervene (p. 179).
While this case was admittedly an emergency situation in which no
time was available for detailed consideration, both Skelly Wright and
Miller give questionable justifications for the intervention. Among
4. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
5. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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these are the woman's responsibility to care for her infant (p. 182), her
apparent incapacity to make a rational decision (demonstrated primarily by her refusal of the transfusion) (p. 181), and the possible liability
of the hospital (p. 183). In addition, Miller makes the bizarre remark
that the hospital should receive the blame for the intervention since,
"with overweening arrogance," it determined what was best for the
patient and therefore played God (p. 185). How the hospital can be
criticized for this hubris without Skelly Wright receiving equal, if not
greater, blame for "playing God" remains unclear.
The true reason for Skelly Wright's decision becomes apparent
from his discussions with students at a 1982 seminar. After being
questioned about the legal niceties of the decision, Wright wondered
out loud: "How much would you bet . . . that Mrs. Jones and her
child are glad today for the decision?" (p. 186). The absence of traditional legal analysis in this statement is astounding, especially considering that both freedom of religion and privacy were involved in the
case. Yet, irrespective of its ultimate persuasiveness, the rhetorical
question Skelly Wright posed is powerful because of its undeniable
sincerity. The appeal that the decision takes on in light of Skelly
Wright's musings should cause one to consider seriously the value of
traditional legal analysis, even in nonemergency situations where it is
logistically possible to employ it.
What motivates J. Skelly Wright to use such nontraditional approaches when rendering his judicial decisions? Miller offers a theory
that he calls "Reason-Directed Societal Self-Interest." According to
this theory, aiding disadvantaged individuals benefits the entire community by bridging the chasm between different classes and thereby
yielding greater social stability.
Miller finds examples of this concern for society as well as the individual in Wright's passion for equality and his awareness that equality
is valuable to the advantaged as well as the oppressed. In striking
down a Washington, D.C., school district scheme to group students by
skill because it would result in further de facto discrimination, Wright
wrote: "What supports this call is our horror at inflicting any further
injury on the Negro ... and also our common need of the schools to
serve as the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race relations in this country. "6
Although both the first and last chapters clearly indicate that this
book is, in fact, about Judge Wright, it is obvious that to a certain
extent Skelly Wright is used merely as a vehicle to present Miller's
views on the role of judges and law in solving the continuing problems
of our society.7 Certainly, Skelly Wright is a good choice for Miller
6. P. 58 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)) (emphasis in original).
7. Many of Miller's own ideas have been discussed in his earlier works. See, e.g., Miller,
"Constitutionalizing" the Corporation, 22 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 95

878

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:861

since Wright appears to approximate the paradigm judge for his concept of ideal adjudication. Nevertheless, the book leaves one with the
sense that the attempt to discover J. Skelly Wright got lost amidst the
theoretical constructs created by Arthur Selwyn Miller. This observation is not intended to question the value of the book per se, but
merely to caution the reader not to expect a report of the professional
experiences of J. Skelly Wright.
A corollary to the above criticism is that A "Capacity for Outrage"
does not focus on what Wright himself thinks. However, Miller's
work provides a useful introduction to the companion volume, On
Courts and Democracy, which does present Wright's own views directly. On Courts and Democracy contains nine articles written by
Skelly Wright that were originally published between 1965 and 1982.
While they represent less than one-sixth of his total nonjudicial writings, 8 they are the primary articles that Miller refers to in A "Capacity
for Outrage" and follow the same general themes pursued by Miller.
Free speech in the context of c~paign financing, 9 school desegregation, 10 affirmative action, 11 judicial review of administrative decisions, 12 and judicial activism in general 13 are the issues presented by
the articles included here - just as they are in the other volume.
On Courts and Democracy provides a convenient collection of articles that are useful if the reader chooses to evaluate Skelly Wright
without either the assistance or interference of Miller. In addition,
each article is prefaced by a small note that introduces the article and
places it in the context of Miller's interpretation of Judge Wright's
philosophy.
Nevertheless, the compilation of essays in On Courts and Democracy does not appear to add much to the literature about Skelly
Wright. A "Capacity for Outrage" does create a desire for a firsthand
examination of the judge's views and, in this sense, the collection of
(1982); Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First National Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1981); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SUP. Cr. REV. 199; Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U.
DAITON L. REv. 633 (1983); see also note 2 supra.
8. See ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 283-85 for a complete list of Skelly Wright's writings.
9. P. 73, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); p. 97,
Money and the Pollution ofPolitics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
10. P. 167, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 285 (1965).
11. P. 195, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI, L. REV. 213
(1980).
12. P. 137, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1980); p. 231, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 COR·
NELL L. REv. 375 (1974); p. 257, Beyond,Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
13. P. 3, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society - Judicial Activism or
Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968); p. 33, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and
the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
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writings is a natural companion to it. However, Miller's own book
gives adequate direction to the original sources of the articles in this
collection. As might be expected, these sources are not obscure. Furthermore, while Miller's comments about each article offer interesting
opinions about Wright's views and insight into the impetus for the
articles, A "Capacity for Outrage" already explains Miller's opinions.
In the final analysis, On Courts and Democracy satisfies a curiosity
created by A "Capacity for Outrage, " but a relatively easy trip to the
library might serve as well.
Perhaps A "Capacity for Outrage" can best be described as a synthesis of earlier works by Miller 14 ·and recent tributes to J. Skelly
Wright. 15 The reader who is more interested in a biography of Skelly
Wright than in a theoretical evaluation of what Skelly Wright means
to law and adjudication may be better off skippping Miller's book and
reading instead Michael Bernick's brief outline of his life and career. 16
Moreover, the book is essentially a testimonial to the career and
tenacity of Skelly Wright, despite Miller's avowed intention not to
"paint a portrait of 'Saint Skelly' " (p. xiii). As such, A "Capacity for
Outrage" probably will not bridge the gap between the advocates of
judicial activism and judicial restraint. However, while agreement
with the views expressed by Miller will largely depend on the reader's
own predisposition toward the proper role of the judiciary, A "Capacity for Outrage" should be recognized by all as a fine analysis of Skelly
Wright as well as a solid contribution to the continuing debate over
judicial activism.
- Alan M Koschik
14. See note 7 supra.
15. See 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 857-999 (1980) (numerous tributes to, or evaluations of, J.
Skelly Wright).
16. Bernick, The Unusual Odyssey ofJ. Skelly Wright, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 971 (1980).

